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SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONAL
POWER AND REDRESS FOR ITS ABUSE
By Gary B. Lovellt
Just as the phenomenal rise in the number of administrative agencies in
the 1930's and 1940's focused public attention on the brand new field of
administrative law, today the equally startling expansion in the field of
congressional investigations1 is raising similarly complex problems of an
equally serious nature. The field of administrative law is now crystallized
by an ever-expanding body of statutory and case law, but one need not
delve too far into the decade past to uncover the abuses and inequities
whidh gave rise to our present day administrative safeguards. Agencies
were enforcing in the courts rules and regulations of whose existence a pri-
vate party had no inkling;2 farmers were brought face to face with the
colossus of government with no means of knowing the nature or structure
of the agency they were opposing;' immigration and deportation proceed-
ings were conducted without adherence to any statutory or regulatory pat-
tern and in complete disregard of individual rights and dignity; 4 in short,
the abuses of the executive branch of our government were creating a cry-
ing need for reform. Today, with the passage of the Federal Register Act
of 1935,5 the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,6 and the vast body of
case law which has grown up thereunder, the worst of these abuses have
been curbed. But now we face an equally serious spectre of abuse of indi-
vidual rights and liberties, this time emanating from the legislative branch
of the government. In the decade which has elapsed since World War II,
the public has witnessed congressional investigations into the field of gov-
ernment, the professions of law and medicine, the arts, the field of writing,
the motion picture industry, education, and, in short, into virtually every
t B.A., 1949, University of California, Berkeley; LL.B., 1954, University of California,
Hastings College of Law; LL.M., 1956, New York University; Member, State Bar of California.
1 Since the first inquiry by a House special committee in 1792, it is estimated that more
than 1,000 investigations have been conducted by Congressional committees of the two Houses.
At the 1953 session of the 83rd Congress, a total of $3.4 million was appropriated for investiga-
tions. See GALLOWAY, TnE LErISLATYE PROCMSS IN CONCRESS (1953).
2 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). During the trial of the Panama
Refining case, the government attorney pulled an applicable regulation out of his hip pocket to
be introduced into evidence. Counsel for the private party said his client knew nothing of the
regulation, and petitioned the court not to enforce such "hip pocket" legislation.
3 See Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). See also § 3 of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C.A. 1003 (1946).
4 See, for example, Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D.C. Mass., 1920), where immigra-
tion authorities modified a rule that an arrested alien should at the outset of the hearing be
apprised of his right to have counsel.
549 STAT. 500, 44 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1935).
660 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1946).
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phase of American life. In spite of the fact that the vast majority of these
investigations have been conducted in a decent and dignified manner, this
era has nonetheless produced such spectacles as a United States Army Gen-
eral being subjected to wholly unjustified humiliations,' a prominent writer-
educator having his character assassinated by innuendo emanating from a
Congressional committee,8 and untold hundreds of others losing their eco-
nomic livelihood as a direct result of oppressive action which bore no rela-
tion to any legitimate legislative purpose.
It is the aim of this study to examine the scope and limitations of this
investigational power of the legislature, to review the major defenses which
have been advanced against it, and finally to probe the potential existence
of an affirmative right of redress against legislative abuse of individual
rights in the inquisition process.
Development of Investigative Power
The earliest omen of the events of the past decade occurred in 1792
when this country's first legislative investigation was empowered by the
House of Representatives to look into the defeat of General Arthur St.
Clair by the Indians on the Wabash.9 As a result of two highly publicized
and disastrous retreats, neither of which were due to any fault of his, Gen-
eral St. Clair was held in great disrepute by the populace. Though the Gen-
eral was completely cleared by the resulting inquiry, the defeat being laid
to poor logistics, he was never vindicated in the public mind, and as a result,
died in poverty and disrepute.Y The power and scope of authority of this
first investigating committee went unchallenged, as St. Clair welcomed it as
an opportunity to absolve himself of blame. In subsequent investigations,
however, it became necessary to justify this inquisitorial power of the legis-
lature.
Under the basic American theory of a government of laws and not of
men, the Constitution rules supreme. Thus any authority of a congressional
committee essential to the legislative process must be found in the powers
granted to Congress in article I, section 1, and in section 5, clause 2 of the
Constitution:
"Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.
Section 5.... Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
7 Communist Infiltration in the Army, Hearings of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
8 LATrImORE, ORDEAL By SLANDER (1950).
9 ANo. CONG. 490-94 (1792).
10 TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 27 (1955).
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punish its members for disorderly Behavior and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member."
With the authorization of Congress impliedly set out in such vague terms
by the Constitution, it remained for subsequent case law to place the inves-
tigatory power within bounds, which are even today not clearly defined.
One of the earliest cases testing the legislative power to compel testi-
mony in the course of an investigation was Kilbourn v. Thompson." This
case involved an inquiry by the House into the operations of a real estate
pool of which Kilbourn was a member along with Jay Cooke & Co., and the
loss of government funds due to an improvident deposit made by the Secre-
tary of the Navy in the London branch of the firm. Kilbourn refused to
answer questions propounded by the Committee, and as a result, was or-
dered arrested by the House to answer for contempt. In an action for false
imprisonment, he joined the sergeant-at-arms with the members of the
committee responsible for his arrest. The court held that Congress lacked
the inherent power to punish for contempt. Mr. Justice Miller also stated
that the whole inquiry was "simply a fruitless investigation into the per-
sonal affairs of individuals, . . .could result in no valid legislation on the
subject to which the inquiry referred," and hence was beyond the constitu-
tional power of the House. Having so decided the basic principles of the
case, the important question remained as to the liability of the two categor-
ies of defendants-i.e. the sergeant-at-arms who carried out the physical
arrest of plaintiff, and the members of Congress who ordered the act. The
court looked primarily at the constitutional provision which declares that
senators and representatives "shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall not be ques-
tioned in any other place."' 2 Did the House Resolution authorizing Kil-
bourn's imprisonment fall within the meaning of the clause? Looking to the
probable intent of the framers, with English precedents fresh in mind, the
court held that the constitutional clause did grant immunity to the legisla-
tive defendants in this case, but added:"
"It is not necessary to decide here that there may not be things done, in the
one House or the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the mem-
bers who take part in the act may be held legally responsible. If we could
suppose the members of these bodies so far to forget their high functions
and the noble instrument under which they act as to imitate the Long Par-
liament in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of the nation, or to follow
11 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
12 U.S. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 6.
13 103 U.S. at 204.
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the example of the French Assembly in assuming the function of a court for
capital punishment, we are not prepared to say that such an utter perver-
sion of their powers to a criminal purpose would be screened from punish-
ment by the constitutional provision for freedom of debate."
If these words were intended to point out a weak link in the chain of abso-
lute legislative immunity, they led to no serious challenge of the doctrine for
some 70 years.14
While the Kilbourn case did affirm Congress' right to investigate, it re-
mained for later cases to expand this right and then to set limits upon it. In
the important 1927 case of McGrain v. Daugherty,", the supreme court was
concerned with this investigatory power as incidental to the congressional
power to make law. The case grew out of a Senate investigation of alleged
maladministration of the Department of Justice under Attorney General
Daugherty. A senate subpoena was served on Mally S. Daugherty, an Ohio
banker and brother of the Attorney General. After disregarding the sub-
poena, he was arrested by the sergeant-at-arms, and thereafter sought re-
lease on a writ of habeas corpus. The district judge granted the writ and
discharged Daugherty from custody.'6 Citing Justice Miller's opinion in
the Kilbourn case, the judge held that the Senate was not acting in a legis-
lative capacity, but was usurping judicial functions by undertaking a trial
of the Attorney General. Not wanting to torpedo the power of congressional
inquiry, the supreme court reversed the district judge and declared that the
Senate could require Mally Daugherty to testify. Justice Van Devanter
based this important opinion on two main generalizations: 17
"One, that the two houses of Congress... possess not only such powers as
are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary pow-
ers as are necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective;
and the other, that neither house is invested with 'general' power to inquire
into private affairs and compel disclosures, but only with such limited
power of inquiry as is shown to exist when the rule ... just stated is rightly
applied."
The Daugherty case thus clearly affirmed the power of Congress to investi-
gate as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
Van Devanter's opinion also stated that neither House was invested with
general power to inquire into private affairs. Since that time, however, leg-
islation has clarified the situation. Investigatory powers were specifically
granted to the standing committees of the Senate by the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946:18
14 See infra, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1950).
15 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
16 299 Fed. 620 (S.D. Ohio 1924).
17 273 U.S. at 173-174.
18 STAT. 812, 2 U.S.C.A. § 190b (1946).
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§ 190b. (a) Each standing committee of the Senate, including any sub-
committee of any such committee, is authorized to hold such hearings, to
sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and ad-
journed periods of the Senate, to require by subpoena or otherwise the at-
tendance of such witnesses and the production of such correspondence,
books, papers, and documents, to take such testimony and to make such ex-
penditures (not in excess of $10,000 for each committee during any Con-
gress) as it deems advisable. Each such committee may make investigations
into any matter within its jurisdiction, may report such hearings as may be
had by it, and may employ stenographic assistance at a cost not exceeding
25 cents per hundred words. The expenses of the committee shall be paid
from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the
Chairman."
On the House side, the Act granted general investigatory powers only to
the Committee on Un-American Activities. Therefore, authority of other
committees must be sought in specific resolutions passed by the House for
that purpose.
Having pointed out the legislative affirmance of the basic investigative
right, it now becomes necessary to discuss the major case law limitations
which have developed subsequent to Daugherty.
Pertinency of Questions
One of the defenses most often raised by witnesses who have refused in-
formation to congressional committees is lack of pertinency. Section 192 of
Title 219 of the United States Code makes refusal to answer pertinent ques-
tions a misdemeanor. To establish pertinency, two elements are required:
(1) The material sought or answers requested must relate to a legislative
purpose which Congress can constitutionally entertain; (2) such material
or answers must fall within the grant of authority actually made by Con-
gress to the investigating committee." A long line of cases says that a wit-
ness may refuse to answer a question which is not pertinent. For example,
in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Supreme Court stated that a witness need
not testify" . . . where the bounds of the power are exceeded or the ques-
tions are not pertinent to the matters under inquiry." Sinclair v. United
States2 established the rule that the pertinency of a question is a matter of
19 The entire section reads as follows: 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. Refusal of witness to testify or
produce papers. Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of
either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any" matter under inquiry
before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of
the two Houses of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to an-
swer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in
a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months As amended June 22,
1938, c. 594, 52 STAT. 942.
20 United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
21 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
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law which the court must decide. Later cases have held steadfastly to the
rule of pertinency. However, a witness who refuses to answer acts at his
peril and will not be saved from contempt charges because he "honestly"
thought the question was irrelevant. In Townsend v. United States,2 the
court held that intentional or deliberate action is to be considered as "wil-
ful" so far as contempt is concerned. In actual practice, the pertinency de-
fense is somewhat illusory. The relevance and materiality of the question
are normally presumed, and the resolution authorizing the investigation is
usually so vague that it is hard to ask a question which is not arguably rele-
vant in some way, if only as a foundation for later questions. To compound
the problems of the witness, he must make a split-second gamble as to per-
tinency. If he answers a question which he honestly thinks is not pertinent,
he is allowing the committee to inquire into areas of his private life which
may be unjustified by the resolution authorizing the investigation. If he
.refuses to answer, even though in good faith, the committee may later cite
him for contempt. He would then find himself subjected to penalties for his
original refusal even though he may now be willing to answer after a court
ruling as to pertinency.
The most recent case on pertinency concerns a witness who gambled on
a refusal to answer, was cited for contempt, gained a momentary victory,
and then defeat. 3 The House Un-American Activities Committee was au-
thorized "to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United
States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-
American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a do-
mestic origin.. ., and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would
aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation."' In a 1954 hearing,
Watkins, a labor union official, was asked questions concerning the identity
of communists in a union between 1942 and 1947. His refusal to answer was
based on the claim that the questions were not pertinent to the inquiry au-
thorized by the Committee's enabling resolution. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia first ruled in Watkins' favor in January, 1956,
with Judges Edgerton and Bazelon denying the pertinency of the questions
over Judge Bastian's dissent. On a rehearing En Banc, some 3 months later,
the court reversed itself, over the dissents of Edgerton and Bazelon. Judge
Bastian, now writing for the majority, stated:25
"It would be quite in order for Congress to authorize a committee to inves-
tigate the rate of growth or decline of the Communist Party, and so its nu-
22 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
2 Watkins v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rehearing denied May 22, 1956.
24 60 STAT. 828 (1946).
25 See note 23 supra at 684.
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merical strength at various times, as part of an inquiry into the extent of
the menace it poses and the legislative means that may be appropriate for
dealing with that menace. Inquiry whether thirty persons were Commu-
nists between 1942 and 1947 would be pertinent to such an investigation."
With such confusion in the higher echelons of the judiciary, it is apparent
that there are few reliable standards to guide a witness as to the pertinency
of any given question during the short interval in which he must make up
his mind.
Privilege against self-incrimination
The Fifth Amendment today stands as the most substantial limitation
on Congressional inquiries into private affairs.6 Although it has generally
been assumed that the privilege against self incrimination could be invoked
by witnesses testifying before congressional committees, the Supreme Court
had not ruled on this question until the recent companion cases of Quinn v.
United States,' Emspak v. United States,2" and Bart v. United States.'
Each of the defendants had been convicted of contempt of Congress30 for
refusing to answer questions posed by a House subcommittee on un-Ameri-
can activities. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions in three opin-
ions by Chief Justice Warren. While the major arguments of the parties
centered around the proper invocation of the privilege, there was, of neces-
sity, an implied affirmation of the existence of the privilege at Congressional
hearings.
With the Supreme Court having so affirmed the existence of the privi-
lege, it becomes important to set out its limits and the type of questioning
under which it may be invoked. It is sufficient to make the privilege appli-
cable that testimony in any proceedings may provide the clues or links by
which the guilt of the witness may be established.3 A 1931 New York case
set out a well-worded test for invoking the privilege :32
"A witness is not required to show, in order to make his privilege available,
that the testimony which he declines to give is certain to subject him to
prosecution, or that it will prove the whole crime, unaided by testimony
from others. It is enough, to wake the privilege into life, that there is a rea-
sonable possibility of prosecution, and that the testimony, though falling
short of proving the crime in its entirety, will prove some part or feature
of it, will tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circum-
stances which others may supply."
26 See e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
159 (1950), though both of these cases involved proceedings before federal grand juries.
27 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
28 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
29 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
30 Supra note 19.
31 Supra note 27.
32 Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 256, 177 N.E. 489, 493 (1931).
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Under the recent case of Ullman v. United States,' further limitations
were placed on invocation of the privilege. It does not include unpleasant
consequences other than possible future prosecution. A witness having
knowledge of the commission of a crime or of material facts of concern to
a third party or to the public at large is required to testify. This is regard-
less of his personal inclinations, or his belief that it would cause him injury
in the estimation of his friends or in his own estimation, or of his caprice or
sentiment, or because the discourse is distasteful to him. Excepting only
where his testimony may tend to incriminate him, the right of the inquiring
body to know has always been paramount to his preference for silence. An
additional facet of the Ullman case was its upholding of the Immunity Act
of 19541 as a valid limitation on the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Statute provides that a witness compelled to testify may not be "prose-
cuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture" and his testimony may not
be used as evidence "in any criminal proceeding" against him "in any
court." According to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Ullman case, the Fifth
Amendment can only be interposed against a question when the witness is
asked to "incriminate himself." But where the criminality has been taken
away, as under the Immunity Act of 1954, then the amendment ceases to
apply. Thus the enactment, without sacrificing the right against self-incrim-
inations, provides the means of obtaining testimony thought to be indis-
pensable to the national security.
First Amendment
To date, the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on whether violation
of rights under the First Amendment is sufficient reason for refusal to an-
swer questions of an investigating committee. However, such an argument
was advanced in the case of United States v. Rumely.35 Rumely, a regis-
tered lobbyist, refused to supply a congressional committee investigating
lobbying activities with the names of purchasers of books and pamphlets
distributed by him to the general public. He was cited and convicted of con-
tempt of Congress, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the conviction and this reversal was upheld by the Supreme Court.
However, the majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter specifically side-
stepped the First Amendment argument, and based the opinion on two main
factors: (1) The House Resolution creating the committee did not author-
ize investigation into efforts to influence public opinion; and (2) as Con-
gress has no power to legislate concerning attempts to influence public
33350 U.S. 812 (1956).
34 68 STAT. 745, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. II) § 3486, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486 (1954).
'5345 U.S. 41 (1952).
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opinion, it would have no authority to investigate such activities. Justices
Black and Douglas, in a concurring opinion, sought to base the holding
squarely on the First Amendment. In essence, they held that the effect of
the divulgence of the names requested by the Committee would be to
impeach those individuals at the bar of public opinion. To allow the Com-
mittee to so impeach them would be to sanction direct federal action in vio-
lation of the individual's right to freedom of speech, freedom of publication,
and right to petition the government-all guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. This view was further strengthened by the strong dissenting opinion
in the Barsky3 6 case, wherein Judge Edgerton aptly stated the governing
principle: "What Congress may not restrain, Congress may not restrain
by exposure and obloquy. The First Amendment forbids Congress pur-
posely to burden forms of expression that it may not punish."
Right of Privacy
Prior to the twentieth century expansion of congressional investigation,
the right of privacy was given full recognition. In the heyday of the "Rob-
ber Barons," Congress created a commission to investigate the lootings of
railroads by Huntington, Stanford, and Jay Gould. Justice Stephen J. Field
refused to force Stanford to disclose company records, saying, 7 "It cannot
be that the courts of the United States can be used in furtherance of investi-
gations in which all rules of evidence may be thus disregarded." Field could
not see that the disposition of the money about which Stanford had been
questioned was any concern of the United States, and regarded the proceed-
ings as an unjustifiable intrusion. He declared:
"Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more es-
sential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemp-
tion of his private affairs, books and papers from the inspection and scrut-
iny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights would
lose half their value." 38
The compulsory production of the private books and papers of a party
otherwise than in the course of judicial proceedings or a direct suit for that
purpose was, according to Field, "The forcible intrusion into, and compul-
sory exposure of one's private affairs and papers, without judicial process,
or in the course of judicial proceedings, which is contrary to the principles
of a free government, and is abhorrent to the instincts of Englishmen and
Americans."
36 Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
37 In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 259 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
38 Id. at 250.
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Today, there is apparently no such thing as a right of privacy which can
be successfully raised against a question which meets the tests of perti-
nency. In United States v. Orman,9 an Atlantic City gambler had been
called as a witness before the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Or-
ganized Crime in interstate commerce. In refusing to furnish the committee
with certain personal financial information, he raised no constitutional priv-
ilege, but merely stated, "It is my personal affair." The court established
that the two elements of pertinency were present-i.e. (1) that the mate-
rial sought or answers requested related to a legislative purpose which Con-
gress could constitutionally entertain; and (2) that such material or an-
swers fell within the grant of authority actually made by Congress to the
investigating committee-and on this basis affirmed Orman's contempt
conviction under 2 U.S.C.A. section 192. In substance, the court held that
the right to be let alone in one's private affairs must be weighed against the
policy behind Congressional fact-finding inquiries in aid of legislation-i.e.
the right of free speech is not absolute, but must yield to national interests
justifiably thought to be of larger importance. The same is true of the right
to remain silent.
In the recent questioning of Arthur Miller by the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, the author put forth a novel off-shoot of the right
of privacy. When asked by the committee counsel to name those with whom
he had admittedly attended communist party meetings, he replied :40
"I will be perfectly frank with you in everything relating to my activities.
I take the responsibility for everything I have ever done, but I cannot take
responsibility for another human being.... All I can say, sir, is that my
conscience will not permit me to use the name of another person ... "
On the basis of this reply, the Committee voted to cite Miller for contempt
and the recommendation was accepted by the House of Representatives. In
spite of a strong moral justification for his conduct, there appears to be no
legal defense which can be fashioned from Miller's reply.
Absence of a Quorum
In Christoffel v. United States, ' a decision based on the perjury statute,
it was held that a quorum of a committee had to be present at the time a
perjury or contempt was committed. The court said the act required the
presence of a "competent tribunal" and that unless a majority of the com-
mittee were actually present, such a body could not be the instrument of a
criminal conviction. The court further said that the objection could not
39 Supra note 20.
40 New York Post, July 13, 1956.
41 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
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properly be made until the trial for perjury, thus placing a rigorous limita-
tion on the conduct of investigations. However, the court appeared to limit
its position in the later cases of United States v. Bryan42 and United States
v. Fleischman43 where the charge involved was contempt rather than per-
jury. Chief Justice Vinson held that the burden is on the witness to raise
the quorum question at the time of the hearing, and his failure to do so, with
the intent to save the objection until the trial, is wilful obstruction of the
committee's process. It was pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson in his con-
curring opinion that the court had at least tacitly overruled the Christoflel
decision.
By way of internal regulation, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 180,
81st Congress, authorizing standing committees and subcommittees to fix a
lesser number than one-third of its entire membership who shall constitute
a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony. Thus these Senate
committees and subcommittees can authorize interrogation by a single
member. This provision is not carried in the House rules, but there is ap-
parently no objection to the designation of small House subcommittees for
the purpose of taking testimony. Under the rule of the Bryan case, a wit-
ness may rightfully demand the presence of a quorum, and if this is done,
the committee should show specifically in the transcript at that point that a
quorum was present.
In United States v. Moran,44 the enabling resolution authorized the
committee to fix the number necessary for taking testimony. It was held
that testimony could be taken by one member sitting alone, even though
three members constituted a majority. Thus there remains little judicial re-
straint on the power of Congress to conduct one man investigations.
Affirmative Redress for Investigative Abuses
The foregoing discussion has sought to point out only the major de-
fenses which have been raised by witnesses before congressional investigat-
ing bodies. But even assuming the future survival of these legal defenses,
the past 8 to 10 years have shown the serious economic45 and social4 stigma
which attaches to any witness who incurs the animosity of some of today's
more vociferous congressional investigating committees. Thus it becomes
apparent that wrongs are being committed under the guise of government
authority for which there is no present redress. One bold attempt has been
42339 U.S. 323 (1950).
43 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
44 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952).
45 See CoGLEY, REPORT ON BLACKIJSTING (The Fund For The Republic, Inc., 1956).
46 F ux JACxsoN, So HELP ME GoD (The Viking Press, 1955).
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made in recent years to puncture the circle of legislative immunity and ob-
tain affirmative redress for abuses.
In the 1950 case of Tenney v. Brandove,47 plaintiff sued California's
Tenney Committee on Un-American Activities. Alleging violation of the
federal Civil Rights Statutes48 based on his being ordered to appear before
the committee to explain a petition he had circulated amongst members of
the state legislature, plaintiff asked for expenses incurred in attending com-
mittee hearings as well as punitive damages. He charged that the hearing
was held to, and did, deprive him of his constitutional rights of free speech,
to petition the legislature for redress of grievances, equal protection, due
process, and constitutional privileges and immunities. The Federal district
court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals for the 9th Circuit
reversed,49 holding that the complaint stated a cause of action. The supreme
court took the case on certiorari and reversed the 9th Circuit, holding that
the remedies created by the Civil Rights Statutes do not abolish the ancient
rule under which legislators are immune from liability for acts done within
the sphere of legislative activity. 0 In short, the majority said that legisla-
tive immunity is not destroyed by a mere claim of unworthy purpose. But
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a thought-provoking dissent, sought to hold the leg-
islators to the same rule of law which governs ordinary citizens. Opining
that the committee brought the weight of its authority down on plaintiff
solely for exercising his right of free speech, Douglas stated:
"Reprisal for speaking is as much an abridgment as a prior restraint. If a
committee departs so far from its domain to deprive a citizen of a right pro-
tected by the Constitution, I can think of no reason why it should be im-
mune .... It is speech and debate in the legislative department which our
constitutional scheme makes privileged. Included, of course, are the actions
of legislative committees that are authorized to conduct hearings or make
investigations so as to lay the foundation for legislative action . . . . But
when a committee perverts its power, brings down on an individual the
47 341 U.S. 367 (1950).
48 U.S.C. § 43 (1946): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress." 8 U.S.C. § 47 (3) (1946): "If two or more persons in
any State or Territory conspire... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws ... whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators."
49183 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1950).
50o Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1950).
May, 1957]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
whole weight of government for an illegal or currupt purpose, the reason
for the immunity ends." (Emphasis added.) 51
The full impact of Douglas' words, coupled with the fact that both ex-
ecutive52 and judicial"3 privilege have fallen where violation of Civil Rights
Statutes has been shown, would seem to indicate that legislative immunity
too should fall where gross excesses are shown to violate individual rights.
Rules of procedure are today being promulgated by many of the com-
mittees. 4 But in the event that those committees who are guilty of the most
serious abuse of individual rights continue their present course of conduct,
the time would seem to be ripe for a wronged party to seek affirmative re-
dress similar to the civil law remedy against the sovereign for wrongs of its
agents.5 Strong backing for such an action may be found in the closing
words of the Kilbourn v. Thompson opinion, and is bulwarked by Douglas'
dissent in the Brandhove case.
Under the French civil law system, the state is responsible in every case
where damage has been caused by its acts.56 While legislative investigation
in France has not developed to the prominent position it enjoys in the
United States, it has existed in one form or another since early in the 19th
century.5 7 However, the rule of state liability for legislative acts which dam-
age particular individuals did not evolve until 1938. In that year, the
French administrative court, the "Conseil D'Etat," granted recovery for a
legislative act which deprived plaintiff of "equality of the citizenry." ' It
could be argued that United States courts could accomplish the same end
result by their power to declare legislative action unconstitutional, which
power has never been asserted by the French courts. However, the French
courts have come much closer to the desired goal-that of actually making
the abused plaintiff whole-by their granting of monetary damages.
In suits against the sovereign for wrongful acts of its agents, the French
courts distinguish between "fautes de service" (service-connected faults)
and "fautes personnelle" (personal faults). Personal faults include those
that involve willfulness, malice, gross negligence, or action by the officer
outside the scope of his official functions. Actual recovery for both types of
11 Id. at 382-83.
5 Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
, Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
54 See e.g., H.R. REs. 78, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955).
5 SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CoMMoN LAW WORLD, 250 et seq.
(1954).
10 Id. at 302.
1, Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative
Study. 11 U. Cnii. L. REv. 1 (1943).
58 Societe des produits Laitiers La Fleurette, January 14, 1938.
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faults is invariably against the state, but the state then has a right of action
against the wrongdoing agent for his personal faults.
It is submitted that an action against a United States legislator should
be allowed to proceed on the basis of this distinction between "faute per-
sonnelle" and "faute de service"-i.e. at a certain point in the inquisitorial
process, the "overbearing" legislator is no longer acting with a legitimate
purpose as his motivation, but has deviated so far in his attack on the in-
dividual that malice or evil motive should be inferred. When the inquisition
has reached this state of affairs, where personal bias appears to constitute
the major motivation, the inquisitor should no longer be dignified with legis-
lative immunity. Allowing such a right of action against a legislator would
be wholly consonant with the basic common law theory of equal protection
of the laws for all, and would still allow bona fide legislative processes to
go forward without restriction.
